The rapid political transformation unfolding in Bangladesh is beginning to reshape its relationship with India, injecting fresh complications into an already tangled history of migration, borders, and citizenship. While security concerns and geopolitical strategy have historically dominated bilateral ties, recent resistance from Dhaka over taking back undocumented migrants has introduced a new, contentious dynamic. What was long treated as a routine border management issue has now snowballed into a simmering standoff, as seen in flare-ups along the Assam and Bengal frontiers. This comes against the backdrop of India’s intensified efforts—framed under “Operation Sindoor”—to push back those it classifies as “illegal immigrants.”
India and Bangladesh share a 4,096.7-kilometre-long border, a stretch historically marked by porosity and people’s movement. In recent years, fencing over 3,200 kilometres of this border has not stemmed the flow entirely. Since the 1980s, India has claimed to have pushed back thousands of undocumented Bangladeshi nationals with the help of state governments and the Border Security Force (BSF). A 2016 estimate put the number of undocumented immigrants in India at around 20 million.
The current campaign to deport such individuals has been sharpened by geopolitical triggers, notably the Pahalgam terror attacks in April, which the Indian government claims highlighted the risks of unchecked illegal immigration. In the wake of these events, multiple state governments—led by Gujarat, Delhi, Haryana, and Assam—have intensified efforts to round up undocumented individuals and hand them over to Bangladesh’s Border Guard (BGB). Media reports note that over 2,000 alleged illegal immigrants have been “pushed back” since early May 2024.
But what was once an informal system of return has hit a wall. Bangladesh’s interim government under Professor Muhammad Yunus has begun resisting these returns, citing sovereignty, human rights, and procedural concerns. The refusal to accept individuals deported by India has escalated into border tensions, particularly in Assam and West Bengal. In Lalmonirhat district, for example, the BGB—with support from local villagers—prevented the BSF from pushing 57 individuals across six separate border points. Bangladesh media reported that 13 people, including women and infants, were left stranded at the zero line, with both countries refusing to accept them. A flag meeting requested by the BGB reportedly went unanswered.
According to The Daily Star, several similar incidents have recently occurred and senior Bangladeshi officials, including military representatives, have publicly condemned India’s approach, labeling it “unacceptable” and warning that such unilateral actions could provoke serious consequences.
The Bangladesh government has formally urged India to cease the ongoing practice of “push-ins,” emphasising that such measures threaten regional security and disrupt bilateral understanding. On May 8, the Bangladeshi foreign ministry issued a letter expressing alarm at the increasing number of individuals being pushed across the border. This diplomatic protest followed reports that the BSF had forcibly pushed around 300 people—including members of the Rohingya community—into Bangladeshi territory between May 7 and May 9. These incidents occurred through various remote locations, including Panchari, Jamini Para, and Khedachhara in the Khagrachhari region, as well as areas in Moulvibazar, the char zones in Raumari of Kurigram district, and even the isolated Mandarbaria island in the Sundarbans.
According to local media reports Bangladesh’s foreign ministry letter warned that these unilateral actions jeopardize national security and could ignite negative public sentiment. The ministry asserted that the push-back operations clearly violate several bilateral agreements, notably the 1975 India-Bangladesh joint guidelines for border coordination, the 2011 Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP), and other understandings reached at director general-level discussions between the BSF and BGB.
According to a senior ministry official, Dhaka reiterated that it would accept only those individuals who can be conclusively identified as Bangladeshi citizens and returned via appropriate legal channels.
Lieutenant General (Retired) Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, Bangladesh’s Home Affairs Adviser, reaffirmed the government’s preference for diplomatic engagement to resolve such matters. Further, Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain and National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman, who also serves as Chief Adviser’s High Representative on Rohingya Affairs, are actively engaged in maintaining diplomatic communications on the issue.
General Chowdhury reiterated Dhaka’s request that the process of push ins be ebandoned and use of formal repatriation routes instead be adopted. “If any Bangladeshi national is found illegally residing in India, they should be returned through the proper channels,” he noted. He also claimed that an attempted push in at the Brahmanbaria border the previous Friday was foiled through coordinated action by the BGB, Ansar personnel and vigilant locals.
In what can be read as a subtle warning to New Delhi, Gen. Chowdhury observed that “If communities remain united and alert, such push ins can be resisted,” framing grassroots vigilance as Bangladesh’s strongest safeguard for its frontier and sovereign laws.
This shift in Dhaka’s stance marks a clear break from its earlier cooperation on undocumented migrants. As recently as 2019, Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen had offered to accept verified Bangladeshi citizens if India provided a list. The new posture—driven by domestic political changes and sovereignty concerns—complicates New Delhi’s decades old strategy of quiet repatriations and back channel diplomacy.
Dhaka can no longer plead ignorance of the relentless stream of border-jumpers. Hard evidence gathered by the Border Security Force shows fresh infiltration attempts surfacing across multiple sectors almost every night. “Protecting the frontier from illegal migrants is a sovereign duty, not an option,” a senior BSF commander stressed, requesting anonymity. That duty was plain to see on May 27, when alert troops in Assam’s South Salmara–Mankachar district intercepted a group of Bangladeshi nationals edging toward the International Boundary before turning them back. Far from political theatre, such operations vindicate New Delhi’s long-standing claim that unchecked migration remains a live and pressing challenge that Bangladesh must acknowledge— and address—without delay.
“In the early hours of May 27, vigilant BSF troops deployed at the Indo-Bangladesh International Border in district South Salmara Mankachar, Assam, observed suspicious movement of Bangladesh nationals approaching the International Boundary from the Bangladesh side with intention to cross into Indian territory… BSF troops challenged them to prevent their unauthorised entry into Indian territory. The Bangladeshi mob subsequently retreated into Bangladesh,” the force said in a statement.
Tension has also flared farther west, where the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has repeatedly objected to India’s efforts to extend fencing at Kaliachak in West Bengal’s Malda district. BSF officers point out that the International Boundary in this sector follows the Kodaliya River, a stretch clearly marked by reference pillars on either bank.
They insist that “there is no change in the status of the IB, or in the BSF’s duty pattern,” and note that both border forces patrol their respective sides of the river, whose mid-stream line serves as the boundary. Because this portion of the frontier remains unfenced, it is especially vulnerable to cross-border smuggling and illegal entry—concerns the BSF cites to justify new barriers and stricter patrols.
Inside India, migration politics are most combustible in Assam, a state haunted for decades by fears of demographic change driven by cross-border influx. Those anxieties fuelled the anti-foreigner movement of the 1970s and produced the 1985 Assam Accord, which in turn led to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1986. By inserting Section 6A into the Citizenship Act, 1955, the amendment drew a bright line based on date of entry: anyone who arrived before 1 January 1966 is deemed a citizen; migrants who entered between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 may stay after registering but must forfeit voting rights for ten years; and all who crossed the border after 24 March 1971 are classified as illegal immigrants liable for detection and deportation.
That framework still anchors Assam’s political consensus. Across parties—including the Congress—leaders reiterate the 24 March 1971 cut off. Raijor Dal chief Akhil Gogoi insists “no genuine citizens must be harassed” yet demands the NRC be completed before deportations proceed. In practice, however, the citizen foreigner divide is anything but clear.
The NRC itself—presented as fulfilling the Accord—sowed fresh disruption: when the final list appeared in 2019, more than 1.9 million people found themselves excluded. Compounded by decisions of Foreigners Tribunals (FTs), families were split, with some members declared Indians and others labeled migrants. Both Bengali speaking Hindus and Muslims suffered, though data indicate Hindus faced even steeper exclusion rates.
Recent crackdowns in Assam, particularly in Goalpara, Kamrup, and Morigaon districts, have laid bare the problems of misidentification, procedural arbitrariness, and wrongful detention. According to media reports On May 23, two individuals in Jaleswar were detained as declared foreigners. One was released after verification, but Abdul Hamid Sheikh, declared a foreigner by the FT in 2018, was sent to the Matia detention centre, even though his lawyer confirmed they were preparing a petition to the High Court.
On May 25, brothers Abu Bakkar Siddik and Akbar Ali were detained by police in Kamrup district. Their nephew had to file a habeas corpus petition to know their whereabouts. Media reports quoted their elder brother Jumuruddin posed a haunting question: “We are five brothers—three of us are Indians and two are foreigners. How can that be possible?”
Perhaps the most telling example of the system’s opacity is that of Khairul Islam, a former schoolteacher detained on May 24 in Morigaon. Islam’s family believed he had been deported after seeing a video allegedly showing him at the border in South Salmara-Mankachar. Days later, he returned home under mysterious circumstances. Eight others arrested alongside him remain in custody at Matia detention centre, despite their families claiming their appeals are pending before higher courts.
Such stories are not isolated. Legal aid workers and family members have recounted how individuals have “disappeared following detention,” with no clear information from authorities. Civil society groups and human rights lawyers have increasingly stepped in to challenge these detentions in the Gauhati High Court.
The Gauhati High Court itself recently ordered the Assam government to provide information on the whereabouts of detainees and to address the “arbitrary arrests” of declared foreigners. The court’s involvement reflects mounting concern over violations of due process, especially when individuals facing deportation have pending appeals.
In response to these concerns, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma clarified that only those who have not appealed FT verdicts would be deported. “If some say they have appeals pending before the Supreme Court or High Court, then no action will be taken against them. But those who have not appealed in the higher judiciary will be pushed back,” he stated. He added that failing to challenge an FT decision forfeits one’s right to stay in the state.
However, the implications of such policies have been far-reaching. Since the NRC process and even before that families have been torn apart, with some members declared citizens and others foreigners. The process has disproportionately affected Bengali-speaking Muslim and Hindu communities, with the latter arguably facing even greater exclusion in the final NRC list.
Moreover, the resistance from Bangladesh comes at a time when geopolitical sensitivities are running high. In January, the BGB had objected to India’s attempts to construct barbed-wire fencing along parts of the border. Now, with increasing opposition to pushbacks, the very foundation of informal cooperation between the two countries is being tested. The strategic patience once shown by Dhaka appears to be wearing thin.
The core issue remains: who gets to define who is a citizen, and through what process? The excessive reliance on tribunals, documentation, and ad hoc administrative discretion is now colliding with Bangladesh’s assertion of sovereign limits. In the absence of a formal, mutually agreed repatriation mechanism, the risk of more people being stranded in legal and geographical limbo looms large.
As tensions rise, the spectre of the NRC returns. Memories of chaos, divided families, and contested identities have resurfaced across Assam, where the lines between citizen and foreigner are often drawn not by facts but by suspicion and flawed documentation. Unless India and Bangladesh revisit their approach to migration through a structured and humane lens, the border may become not just a line of control—but a line of despair.
