The attack by the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) on Assam Police on March 22 has put security agencies on high alert. The timing is significant. Assam is heading into elections, and the broader regional security situation is already under scrutiny. Developments in Bangladesh since the July 2024 uprising and the continuing instability in neighbouring Myanmar have added to the unease.
In the early hours of the attack, ULFA-I cadres fired rocket-propelled grenades at around 2:30 am at the 4th Assam Police Commando Battalion camp in Jagun, Tinsukia. Four commandos—Robi Garg, Jimbus Marak, Debasish Bora and Chittaranjan Mili—were injured in the strike.
The Centre for North East India Security Studies (CNEISS), a New Delhi-based security think tank, had earlier warned of such developments. In a press statement on March 6, 2026, it flagged the possibility of attacks aimed at disrupting the upcoming Assam Assembly elections. A day after the attack, on March 23, the organisation issued another press statement to reiterate its concerns, claiming that more deadly strikes could follow if an emerging militant alliance is not addressed.
According to CNEISS, this alliance includes ULFA-I, the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. These groups, it claims, are coordinating across borders in ways that could destabilize India’s Northeast.
Swapan Debbarma of CNEISS said the March 22 attack signals a shift in ULFA-I’s strategy. He linked this change to a reported two-day meeting held from December 9 to 11, 2025, in Cox’s Bazar. The meeting, he claimed, brought together ULFA-I, PCJSS, ARSA and RSO, and was facilitated by Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. He warned that more attacks could be expected in the run-up to the April 9 elections if security is not tightened.
Debbarma further pointed to the growing role of PCJSS, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as a serious concern. He claimed that its president, Santu Larma, has remained Chairman of the CHT Regional Council for nearly 28 years without elections, and alleged that the group functions as an asset of DGFI.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts itself is increasingly being seen as a grey zone. The region’s difficult terrain, porous borders, and long history of insurgency have made it vulnerable to armed group activity. Analysts say that a mix of local grievances, weak governance, and cross-border linkages has turned parts of the CHT into a logistical corridor—where arms movement, training, and coordination between groups can take place with relative ease.
A judgment by the Guwahati High Court on September 5, 2024, described PCJSS as a terrorist organisation in connection with a 2013 arms seizure in Mizoram. The case involved the recovery of 31 AK-47 rifles, a light machine gun, a Browning automatic rifle and large quantities of ammunition. Despite this, the group is said to remain active, particularly in Mizoram and Tripura.
Debbarma claimed that India has underestimated the threat from PCJSS. He alleged that the group has established around 15 camps in Indian territory—10 in Mizoram and five in Tripura. These include locations in Lunglei, Lawngtlai and Mamit districts in Mizoram, and areas such as Dhalai and North Tripura districts in Tripura.
The report also points to a wider international dimension. CNEISS claimed that in late February 2026, PCJSS received a large consignment of modern arms from Myanmar-based armed groups. These groups, it alleged, had been trained by American mercenary Matthew Aaron VanDyke and Ukrainian nationals who were later arrested by India’s National Investigation Agency on March 13, 2026. The arms were reportedly moved from Paletwa in Myanmar to Thekamukh along the Mizoram-Bangladesh border.
Earlier, on February 26, 2026, a PCJSS representative in Cox’s Bazar, Bidhayak Chakma, allegedly procured 50 sophisticated weapons from Rohingya armed groups for use in destabilizing the Northeast.
CNEISS maintains that this network reflects a broader attempt to create instability in the region. It reiterated that the December 2025 meeting in Cox’s Bazar—reportedly organised by DGFI and ISI—brought together ULFA-I, PCJSS, ARSA and RSO in what it sees as a coordinated effort.
Meanwhile, developments involving ARSA have also drawn attention. On March 17, 2025, Bangladeshi security forces arrested ARSA leader Ataullah, also known as Abu Ammar Jununi, along with nine others. The arrests were carried out by the Rapid Action Battalion during raids in Siddhirganj, Narayanganj and Mymensingh.
Ataullah had played a key role in the 2017 attacks on Myanmar’s military, which triggered a brutal crackdown and mass displacement of Rohingyas. More recently, reports suggest that ARSA has been collaborating with Myanmar’s military junta against the Arakan Army, using the porous borders of northern Rakhine, particularly Maungdaw, to its advantage.
Despite the arrests, there is still no clarity on the charges filed against Ataullah or the outcome of the case. What remains clear, however, is that the evolving linkages between groups across Bangladesh, Myanmar and India are complicating the security landscape.
As Assam approaches elections, the concern is no longer limited to isolated attacks. Security analysts warn that the Northeast may be entering a phase where local insurgencies are increasingly tied to a wider, cross-border network—one that finds space to operate in regions like the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where geography, politics and conflict intersect.
