The Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) appears to be deploying every tactic at its disposal to secure victory in Bangladesh’s upcoming national elections scheduled for February 12. Over the past few weeks, the party has gained noticeable momentum, aided in part by a weak and disorganised campaign by its principal rival, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). This shift has been further accentuated by the absence of the Awami League (AL), which was banned by the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus.
Pre-electoral surveys indicate a sharp rise in Jamaat’s support base, with its projected vote share climbing from around 15 percent to over 30 percent, placing it neck-and-neck with the BNP. However, Jamaat’s surge cannot be attributed solely to the BNP’s lacklustre campaign. More complex and troubling factors appear to be at play, particularly the Islamist party’s aggressive and highly strategic approach to the current electoral contest.
Bangladesh’s 13th national election will see nearly 2,000 candidates—representing more than 50 political parties and independent contenders—competing for 300 parliamentary seats. The election will also coincide with a referendum on the July reform charter, further raising the political stakes.
According to highly placed sources within Bangladesh’s political circles, Jamaat-e-Islami’s leadership, under its Ameer Dr Shafiqur Rahman, is singularly focused on winning the election. “He does not care how it has to be done; he is fixated on winning the elections,” one source said. Others described this as a “by hook or crook” approach—an attitude that could seriously undermine whatever limited elements of a free and fair election still remain.
Reliable inputs suggest that Jamaat has identified 43 constituencies that are considered highly competitive and politically fragile. In these razor-thin seats, the party is learnt to have paid substantial bribes to as many as 40 deputy commissioners and 24 superintendents of police. The objective, according to sources, is to influence officials overseeing the electoral process in ways that could tilt outcomes in Jamaat’s favour.
In a similar vein, Jamaat is also reported to have made concerted efforts to infiltrate school management committees in several areas. Since many polling booths are set up in school premises, control over these committees could potentially allow the party to manipulate voting arrangements—particularly if polling agents are drawn from these institutions.
Political analysts point out that Jamaat’s methodical and well-resourced campaign stands in sharp contrast to the BNP’s relatively ineffective efforts. “The Jamaat campaign has been disciplined, organised and well-funded,” one analyst observed, while noting that the BNP’s campaign committee, headed by party veteran Nazrul Islam Khan, “has not been very effective.”
The extent of Jamaat’s growing influence is further underscored by statements from Awami League leader Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury Nowfel of Chittagong, who has reportedly urged his supporters to vote for Jamaat—an extraordinary development given the party’s long-standing ideological opposition to the AL.
For observers familiar with Jamaat’s organisational culture, this resurgence is not entirely unexpected. A senior journalist and a development worker had earlier told The Borderlens that Jamaat operates as a “gupto” (secretive) party, making it difficult to distinguish between its members and those affiliated with its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. As many Bangladeshis privately admit, “it is hard to say who is a Jamaat worker.” Others note that even after knowing someone for years, they only later discover the individual’s affiliation with Jamaat.
While a section of educated and politically conscious voters may still lean towards the BNP in the absence of the Awami League, Jamaat’s covert strategies—often involving intimidation and coercion—could prove decisive. Even some Jamaat supporters concede that the party employs “different strategies, most of which are carried out very clandestinely.”
One such tactic reportedly involves burqa-clad women workers moving from village to village to survey voters. According to a senior Mirpur-based journalist, this helps Jamaat identify likely voters and those who may abstain. In many rural areas, women traditionally do not vote, with male family members casting votes on their behalf. However, heightened vigilance during this election cycle may curb such practices.
This, in turn, creates an opening for Jamaat’s women workers. As the same journalist noted, by making photocopies of voter ID cards—which remain only partially digitised in Bangladesh—they could potentially enter polling stations and vote in place of others. Existing laws do not mandate lifting the veil for identification, making such manipulation difficult to detect.
Jamaat-e-Islami’s rise—both overt and covert, with the July uprising serving as a critical catalyst—has also raised concerns in neighbouring India. While few articulate this openly, the prospect of Jamaat emerging as a dominant political force or even forming the next government could significantly reshape the regional political landscape, with possible spillover effects in countries such as Myanmar.
Adding to these anxieties is the growing perception that Jamaat is no longer diplomatically isolated. In recent months, the United States—and possibly some of its Western allies—appear to have increased engagement with Jamaat-e-Islami, a shift that has unsettled many observers within Bangladesh and beyond.
The Borderlens had earlier reported that the United States is now openly signalling engagement with Jamaat-e-Islami—Bangladesh’s largest Islamist political party—despite its historical opposition to democratic and secular values. Based on an audio recording, the report suggested that Washington may be recalibrating its Bangladesh policy by treating Jamaat as a legitimate political stakeholder at a critical juncture.
This perceived outreach has drawn sharp criticism from liberal groups, minority communities, and sections of the political class, who argue that Jamaat cannot be treated as just another electoral player. For them, Western engagement undermines long-standing commitments to democracy, pluralism, and minority rights—principles fundamentally at odds with Jamaat’s ideological positions and historical record.
Beyond the United States, diplomats and political representatives from other countries are also reported to have met Jamaat’s Ameer, Dr Rahman, in recent months. While details of these meetings remain opaque, their very occurrence has conferred a degree of international legitimacy that Jamaat previously lacked. For a party long burdened by its opposition to Bangladesh’s Liberation War and its hardline Islamist agenda, this shift carries significant political weight.
What is increasingly clear, however, is that Jamaat’s electoral surge is being accompanied by serious allegations of foul play—from bribery and administrative manipulation to covert voter interference.
Journalists, analysts, and civil society voices within Bangladesh have raised these concerns repeatedly. Critics warn that if such warnings are ignored by the international community in favour of narrow geopolitical interests, the cost may be the integrity of Bangladesh’s electoral process itself. For many inside the country, the central question is no longer just who wins on February 12, but whether the election can still be called credible at all.
