BNP–Jamaat rivalry sparks deadly violence ahead of national election, complicating Bangladesh’s post-upheaval politics
The tactical alliance that once propelled the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami to power under former prime minister Khaleda Zia—after the fall of the nine-year Ershad regime in 1990—has collapsed. In its place has emerged a campaign of street-level warfare that is destabilising the run-up to the critical February 12 national election.
The rupture, accelerating after the seismic political shift of August 5 2024, has transformed a decades-old partnership into a violent struggle for political survival. The clashes have left a trail of casualties and raised growing fears of a broader security breakdown during an already fragile political transition.
The political calculus shifted further with the dramatic return of Tarique Rahman—Khaleda Zia’s son and BNP’s senior vice-chairman, who assumed the party chairmanship following her death—from a 17-year exile on December 25. His re-entry has intensified competition within the opposition space, particularly with Jamaat-e-Islami, in the absence of the Awami League, hardening positions and exacerbating tensions on the ground.
From coalition to collision
Since November 2025, BNP and Jamaat activists have clashed across at least 25 districts and three metropolitan areas over campaign turf, seating arrangements at official events, social media provocations, and local political dominance. These are no longer isolated skirmishes; in several cases, they have turned lethal.
Law enforcement agencies confirm multiple fatalities in recent weeks, including the killing of a local Jamaat secretary in Sherpur, underscoring how quickly seemingly minor disputes have escalated into deadly violence.
“This rupture is driven purely by power, not ideology,” said Dr Sazzad Siddiqui, a political analyst at Dhaka University. “With the old political order upended, Jamaat sees a historic opening to step out of BNP’s shadow and claim the anti-incumbent vote. BNP, weakened by years of repression and struggling for organisational cohesion, is fighting to prevent its own eclipse.”
The numbers paint a stark picture. Dhaka-based rights watchdog Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) documented 852 incidents of political violence between January and November 2025, resulting in 129 deaths and nearly 7,000 injuries, with at least 55 incidents involving direct BNP–Jamaat clashes.
Fresh data from Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) reinforces the grim assessment. Between August 2024 and June 2025, TIB recorded 471 political conflicts that killed 121 people and injured 5,189.
While TIB’s data implicates BNP in 92 percent of all conflict incidents—a reflection of its wider organisational footprint as the primary opposition force—the growing subset of BNP-versus-Jamaat violence marks a troubling and relatively new trend.
Flashpoints and fatalities
The violence has been pervasive and deeply localised. In Sherpur, a dispute over seating at a government-organised manifesto event spiralled into a riot, leading to the death of Jamaat’s Sreepur upazila secretary, Rezaul Karim.
In Lakshmipur and Cumilla, clashes have erupted repeatedly, often triggered by accusations that Jamaat workers were coercively collecting voter information, including national ID details and bKash mobile banking numbers. In Shariatpur, a Facebook post ignited a clash that left eleven people injured.
BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir has echoed similar allegations against Jamaat in recent public speeches.
Police headquarters data reveal a troubling pattern. In the 45 days following the announcement of the election schedule in December, 144 incidents of election-related violence were recorded nationwide. Clashes between rival supporters accounted for the majority, alongside intimidation, arson, and attacks on candidates.
Rhetoric and reality
Despite senior leaders—such as BNP’s Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and Jamaat’s Mia Golam Parwar—publicly toning down anti-India rhetoric, their messaging often fuels tensions at the grassroots. Inflammatory language from mid-level leaders and local cadres, amplified through social media and street rallies, routinely translates into violence on the ground.
This disconnect between top-level caution and grassroots hostility has become a key accelerant of unrest.
Security apparatus under stress
Election officials have promised “unprecedented” security measures. Yet analysts warn that reactive policing and internal party discipline will be insufficient.
“The only real deterrent is firm, impartial, and swift enforcement of the law in identified hotspots,” said criminologist Dr Touhidul Haque.
TIB has also criticised the interim authorities for failing to present a clear electoral roadmap and for slow progress on key reforms—shortcomings that have deepened public anxiety and weakened institutional credibility.
A transactional relationship unravels
The BNP–Jamaat partnership was always transactional. Jamaat, founded in 1941 in Lahore and opposed to Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, was politically rehabilitated under BNP patronage after 1977, when Ziaur Rahman assumed the presidency following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
The alliance peaked with the four-party coalition’s landslide victory in 2001 but steadily frayed after 2008. The current schism is unprecedented both in its intensity and in the absence of any overarching authority—such as a dominant BNP leadership—to manage the relationship. Today, the two parties are no longer allies sharing a platform; they are rivals competing for the same seats and the same voters.
Jamaat’s calculated rebrand and a nod to New Delhi
Amid this opposition infighting, Jamaat has taken a step that has drawn intense scrutiny: nominating Krishna Nandi, a Hindu community organiser from Khulna, as its parliamentary candidate in Khulna-2. For a party with Jamaat’s history, the decision is unprecedented.
Analysts view the move less as an ideological transformation than as a calculated political signal aimed at multiple audiences. Domestically, it seeks to soften Jamaat’s image and broaden its electoral appeal. Internationally—particularly in New Delhi—it is intended as reassurance.
“The message to India is clear: ‘We are capable of pluralism and moderation,’” said a South Asia analyst based in New Delhi. “In the absence of the Awami League—India’s traditional partner and the historical guarantor of minority security—Jamaat is attempting to assuage India’s deepest concerns.”
India’s establishment, however, remains sceptical. The move is widely viewed as strategic eyewash rather than evidence of a genuine ideological shift. Without substantive changes to Jamaat’s foundational doctrines or concrete commitments to minority rights, Nandi’s candidacy is seen as symbolism over substance.
The road to polling day
As polling day approaches, critical questions loom. Can security forces contain violence in volatile districts before and after the vote? Can party leaders rein in their cadres? And can the Election Commission assert credible authority?
The Dr Muhammad Yunus-led interim government’s ability to ensure a level playing field is already under scrutiny. Candidates from smaller parties report widespread violations of the electoral code and say their complaints to the Election Commission have gone unresolved.
The fragmentation of the opposition into warring factions not only risks a violent election day but also complicates the post-poll political landscape. Bangladesh is heading toward a vote in which the dominant campaign message is not policy but violence—and where the opposition is fighting a two-front war: against the remnants of the old order, and, more destructively, against itself.
